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LIFE WITHOUT
"MUST CARRY":
A PRELIMINARY ANALYSIS

At the outset, it may be useful to
review briefly the reasons for the legal
and policymaking communities' failure to anticipate the possibility and
effect of Quincy. Lawyers and policymakers may have underestimated
the vitality of the constitutional challenge to the must carry rules, because
the requirements were viewed as just
part of the age-old battle between
broadcasters and cable operators-a
traditional form of economic guerilla
warfare. Since economic protectionism generally creates less concern than
first amendment limitations, the must
carry issue received relatively little
consideration.
One reason for the failure to examine Quincy's impact may be the
rather murky nature of the D.C. Circuit's opinion. Without undertaking an
analysis of the decision-as others already have done very well-it seems
fair to characterize it as having either
a literal or a pragmatic meaning. Taking the court at its word, it applied the
traditional "substantial government
interest" test, and found that the rules
flunked it. This interpretation would
lead to the conclusion that virtually
any form of must carry rule is unconstitutional.
On the other hand, the court went
out of its way to emphasize the extent
to which it had based its decision on
the FCC's two-decade failure to produce any empirical justification for the
rules. Judge Wright explicitly criticized the Commission for the "blun-
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Introduction
he District of Columbia Circuit
Court of Appeals sent shockwave s throug h lega l and policymaking es ta blis h ments in
July 1985 when it held in the Quincy
Cable case that the Federal Communications Commission's "must carry"
cable television rules violated the free
speech provisions of the First Amendment.
In June of 1986, the Supreme Court
of the United States refused to review
Quincy. The whole controversy thus
fell back into the collective lap of the
Congress, the Commission, and the
various interest groups. Although the
FCC initially exhibited an inclination
not to adopt any must carry rules, it
quickly came under significant
Congressional pressure to take some
action. The FCC responded in August
1986 by adopting new must carry regulations-of perhaps questionable
constitutional validity-which essentially require cable operators to carry
a limited number of "local" television
stations.
Despite all of the sturm und drang
about must carry, none of the industry
or governmental interests has bothered to undertake any real analysisat least publicly-of the rules' abolition. This article reports the results of
a preliminary analysis of Quincy's
economic impact.
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the Commission seem to have taken
even a first step towards creating the
type of rulernaking record which Judge
Wright apparently contemplated in
Quincy. This dearth of information is
surprising- especially in a legal and
political context which seems to require it. It thus seemed useful to undertake a rough cut at analyzing the
economic effects of abolishing the must
carry rules. This analysis is highly
tentative in nature, and is suggestive
rather than definitive. Nevertheless, it
may be useful in terms of encouraging
more refined research.
At the outset, some conclusions appear to be intuitively obvious. Abolition of the rules would impact different
broadcasters in disparate ways. At the
one extreme, stations with what Dr.
Rolla E. Park terms high "attractiveness indices"- primarily network affiliates and strong "superstation"-type
independents- presumably would
continue to be carried by cable operators, because of their appeal to subscribers. (Indeed, were it not for the
"compulsory copyright" provisions of
the Copyright Act, they might have
enough leverage to demand compensation from cable operators.)
At the other extreme, cable systems
would be quick to drop unattractive
stations-such as UHF public broadcasters-unless the systems already
have substantial excess channel capacity. The fact that only a few cable
operators have dropped stations probably is a result of the cable industry's
explicit decision not to create any confrontations at this point; indeed, the
cable trade associations apparently
have advised their members against
dropping signals.
Similarly, different cable operators
would benefit from abolition of the must
carry rules in disparate ways. At the
one extreme, a "saturated" system with
no vacant channels would be able to
add a-or perhaps even a first-pay
channel. thus creating a new revenue
flow equal to a large part of its traditional "basic" service. At the other

derbuss approach of the rules," which
"indiscriminately sweep into their
protective ambit each and ever y
broadcaster . . . " Indeed, the final section of the opinion reads like a traditional review of administrative agency
action, rather than a decision of constitutional dimensions; it places a
heavy emphasis on the FCC's lack of
empirical data, and invites the Commission to do what it should have done
two decades ago-namely, to make a
record as to the need for the must carry
rules.
Whether or not the D.C. Circuit ultimately approves it, the pragmatic
view seems to have been adopted by
both industry interests and regulatory
authorities. None of the private or public sector players has suggested that
all must carry rules are unconstitutional. The operating assumption behi nd the NCTA/NAB/CATA/TOC/INTV
"Joint Industry Agreement" filed with
the FCC is that at least some form of
must carry rules is constitutionally
permissible.
he Joint Industry Agreement resulted in the new must carry rules.
T
A brief description may be useful. Although the new regulations exempt
cable televsion systems with less than
21 channels, they require operators
with 21 to 27 channels to use up to 7
channels for "local" stations, and systems with more than 27 channels to
use up to 25% of their capacity. Cable
systems have complete discretion in
choosingwhich local stations to carry,
except that they must offer at least one
or two noncommercial stations depending on their channel capacity (one
for systems with less than 54 channels, two for systems with more). The
rules also require operators to offer
subscribers free "A/B" switches, to
switch from cable to conventional receiving antennae.
Despite the D.C. Circuit's emphasis
on proving the need for any must carry
rule, neither the industry groups nor
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extreme, an "unsaturated" system with
extra channels would benefit very little from the rules' abolition, because
the rules did not prevent it from adding program services in the past. (A
system might have excess channels
either because it had high bandwidth
or because it had few must carry signals in its market.) Since activation of
a channel involves capital costs of approximately $6,000 and annual operating costs of less than $1,000, an
unsaturated system presumably would
have no reason to delete any station
with even a small number of viewers.
The more difficult question, of course,
is how abolition of the rules would impact upon broadcasters and cable operators which do not fall at either one
of these extremes. This analysis thus
attempted to generate data as to the
impact of the rules' abolition in terms
of the following criteria:

Summary of Data
A. Impact on Broadcasters of
Abolishing Must Carry Rules
he study first attempte d to estimate the economic value of
must carry status-and thus of
loss of that status- to broadcasters. The analysis used a mix of
nine cable systems, which had varying characteristics in terms of number
of subscribers, channel capacity, and
market size. (As will be seen, the latter
two characteristics are relevant primarily in the later consideration of the
value of an additional channel to cable operators.)
The study started from the assumption that a cable system would be most
likely to drop the weakest local station-i.e., the station with the smallest share. As would be expected, this
invariably was a UHF independent
station. Using conventional industry
assumptions as to cost per thousand
viewers (CPM), number of commercial
minutes per hour, and total number of
hours per day on the air, it was possible to arrive at the value of each station's carriage on the system in
question. The analysis then applied
Dr. Rolla E. Park's assumption of a forty
to fifty percent (that is, an average of
forty-five percent) increase in audience through cable carriage, to estimate the increased advertising revenue
attributable to cable carriage-or, once
again, the amount of revenue decrease through loss of carriage.
The study estimated the value of decreased audience size through noncarriage, by using conventional industry statistics-i.e., a six dollar CPM,
a twenty hour broadcast day, and an
average of ten commercial minutes per
hour. (The results are set forth in Table

T

1. Decreased revenues to broadcasters from non-carriage;
2. Increased revenues to cable operators from availability of additional channels; and
3. Comparative losses and gains for
broadcasters and cable operators.
As is obvious from the following
summary and tables, the existing data
are fragmentary at best. It is relatively
easy to generate rough estimates as
to a broadcaster's loss in advertising
revenue from non-carriage, or as to a
cable operator's gain in subscription
revenues from addition of a new channel. The existing data do not help predict, however, either (1) a broadcaster's
losses in an entire television market
(as opposed to on a given cable system) or (2) a cable operator's incentives in adding new services.
Despite these caveats, this initial
analysis may be useful. If nothing else,
it indicates that abolition of the rules
creates widely varying effects from
station to station and system to system. As discussed in the Conclusion,
this has implications for policymaking.

I
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I of the Appendix.)

The dollars lost through non-carriage naturally varied from one situation to another, depending upon the
size of the cable system. The larger the
system, of course, the greater the eco87

tor's potential gain from adding a new
service. As indicated in the Introduction, this aspect of the analysis is
speculative, since it involves secondguessing cable operators' marketing
decisions-a particularly difficult task
since cable operators disagree as to
the most profitable mix of services.
Nevertheless, it seemed fair to posit
that any operator would choose the
most lucrative class of service to replace a must carry signal. The study
thus assumed that, depending upon
its existing channel line-up, a cable
operator would choose a pay cable
channel (such as HBO or Showtime),
with a monthly net revenue of roughly
$4.50 per subscriber. (For large MSOs
with significant bargaining power, of
course, the net revenue figure may be
much higher-as much as $7.00 or $8.00
per month.)
The analysis also relied upon general industry "folklore" in assuming
that the penetration of an additional
pay signal would be 100 percent on a
12-channel system and 50 percent on
a 21 to 35-channel system. These figures may be somewhat optimistic.
While they appear to be in line for relatively new urban and suburban
builds, they probably are somewhat
high for older, rural operations. (The
results are set forth in Table II of the

nomic impact upon the broadcast station. For example, the total annual loss
for a broadcast station carried on a 962
subscriber system was $1,679.00; on a
38,500 subscriber system, $75,883.50;
and on a 93,500 subscriber, $184,288.50.
(Once again, these figures are on a
system-by-system, rather than market-wide basis; a total of these amounts
for a given market naturally would be
substantially higher.)
The size of the potential lost revenues is no surprise, of course, given
Park's estimate of increased viewership through cable carriage. The more
significa nt consideration is that these
figure s reflect the maximum amount
w hich a commercial broadcaster could
pay for carriage in a free market environment.
This in turn raises two questions.
First, while commercial braodcasters
may be willing to pay up to these
amounts for carriage, public stations
may not be a ble to, unless they can
translate a larger audience directly into
increased viewer contributions. This
presumably would d epend largely
u p o n the cabl e s ubs cribers' demograp hics . Moreover, officials at pu blic
s tations probably w ould have a difficult time convincing their superiors that
it was necessary to buy an audience
for fundraising.
Second, and more important, it is
worthwhile to compare these figures
with estimates of cable operators' gains
through the availability of an additional channel. To the extent that a
cable operator consistently can realize more revenue by adding a new service than by receiving payments from
a broadcaster, it p resumably would
have no incentive-and a broadcaster
no ability-to negotiate any type of
compensated carriage.
B. Impact on Cable Operators of

Appendix.)

Perhaps the most striking observation was the often tremendous disparity between broadcasters' losses and
cable operators' gains through abolition of the must carry rules. Returning
briefly to the illustrations in Section
II(A) above, where a broadcaster's annual loss was $1,679.00, the cable operator's gain was $25,974.00; if the loss
were $75,883.50, the gain was
$1,039,500.00; and if the loss were
$184,288.50, the gain was $2,524,500.00.
(Comparative figures for all nine cable
systems are set forth in Table III of the

Abolishing Must Carry Rules

Ap p endix.)

n orde r to compare the impact of the
rules' a b olition on cable operators
Iwith
that on broadcasters, the study

This disparity was not. however,
universal. As would be expected, the
high-capacity systems already carried

next attempted to estimate an opera88

a full complement of pay signals and
thus presumably had little to gain by
freeing up additional channels; this
naturally was most pronounced for
systems with vacant channels (other
than channels unusable for engineering reasons), since by definition these
systems could have added channels
even under the old must carry regime.
Realistically, high-capacity systems with no vacant channels might
realize a small gain by replacing unattractive broadcast stations with satellite programming; since these
systems already carried all of the major satellite networks, however, they
could add just relatively unattractive
services-a move which presumably
would add little revenue beyond the 3
to 5 cents per subscriber per month
paid by some of these services.
In most situations, abolition of the
must carry rules thus helps cable operators more than it hurts broad casters. This result naturally has
several implications. First, it may
demonstrate that must carry rules are
economically inefficient, since their
absence creates more value than their
presence. Second, channel capacity is
highly determinative of the rules' impact; systems with vacant channels
derive no benefit from abolition of the
rules. Third, if a cable operator
knows-as is the case in some of the
situations above-that it invariably
will gain more by adding a new service than by being compensated by a
broadcaster, it has no incentive to deal
with the broadcaster.

broadcasters and gains to most cable
operators from abolition of the rules
are asymmetrical. (Once again, of
course, these observations do not apply to "superstation"-style independent stations with large audiences.)
Although independent broadcasters'
decreases in revenues are quite predictable and consistent. cable operators' increases in revenues vary from
system to system.
The key factor, of course, is a system's current number of vacant channels and of income-producing signals;
if elimination of the must carry rules
does not make a new channel available to an operator, or if an operator
already has a full complement of profitable signals, it has little or no opportunity to increase its revenues.
Conversely, if a system can add a very
profitable channel by dropping a signal, its gain is far more substantial
than the station's loss.
This asymmetrical relationship between losses and gains has several
effects. Many broadcasters may be unable to buy carriage, because the operators' increased revenues exceed the
value of cable carriage to the broadcasters. Conversely, unsaturated systems-generally the new, urban
operations-may have enough vacant
channels that they incur no disadvantage by continuing to carry all local
signals, unless one of them actively
offends their subscribers; the marginal cost of activating a vacant channel is low enough that any station can
afford it. This is not to suggest that
total channel capacity is the key determinant; the number of vacant channels has the primary effect. For
example, under the old must carry ·r ules
a thirty-six channel system in New York
City would have had twenty non-local
channels, while a 36-channel system
in Kalamazoo, Michigan would have
thirty-five.
In a free market environment, the
relationship between broadcasters and
cable operators thus would vary markedly-not just on a market-by-market,

Conclusion
s indica ted in the Introduction, thi s analysis is te ntative , and needs considerably
more refinement before any
firm conclusions can be drawn from it.
Nevertheless, it suggests some conclusions of relevance to the on-going
policy debate over must carry requirements.
Most importantly, and not unexpectedly, losses to most independent
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but also on a system-by-system basis.
This has some obvious implications in
terms of the transactions costs which
might be involved in negotiations for
carriage between broadcasters and
cable operators.
More significantly, this suggests that
any attempt to promulgate uniform
must carry rules- as in the past-will
not reflect the actual economic relationship between broadcasters and
cable operators. Basing carriage rights
on a system's capacity alone does not
reflect the value of an additional
channel to a system, except perhaps
in the case of extremely high-capacity
systems. Moreover, use of a channel
capacity standard obviously invites a
cable operator to deactivate channels
in order to free itself from must carry
requirements.
For example, under the FCC's new
rules, an operator of a twenty-one
channel system would be required to
carry up to seven signals, thus giving
it fourteen channels for non-local programming. By simply deactivating one
channel, the system could remove itself from all must carry obligations,
and thus have twenty channels free for
non-local programming.
It thus seems fair to question whether
the new rules are truly responsive to
the underlying relationships between
broadcasters and cable operators, in
their emphasis on channel capacity as
a trigger for must carry obligations. As
discussed above, there is no necessary relation between a system's number of channels and its ability to
increase its profitability. The FCC's
approach seems to satisfy neither Judge
Wright's criticism that " ... the Commission's promise to 'get the facts' remains unfulfilled," nor his suggestion
that "the Commission must make some
effort to move beyond the amorphous
in defining the interest served by the
must-carry rules."
A more appropriate-and perhaps
legally stronger-approach might be
to base a system's must carry obligations upon guaranteeing a mini-

mum number of channels available for
non-local programming. A system
would have the right to carry a certain
number of channels, defined in terms
of an economically viable program
package under existing industry custom and usage. (To a certain extent,
of course, this harks back to the Commission's initial approach to distant
signal carriage in 1972.)
The size of this package naturally
would vary with a system's channel
capacity; after all, the greater an operator's investment, the greater is its
expected return. Instead of basing a
s ystem's obligations on its capacityregardless of how many channels actually were availa ble for non-local
programming-this approach would
take into consideration d iffering numbers of local signals. It thus would insure that an operator could offer an
economically viable service, regardless of the number of local signals in
its market. (The size of an appropriate
minimum program package for systems with different channel capacities
naturally would need to be established through data on industry pra ctices-thus creating the type of record
which Judge Wright appears to have
contemplated.) This type of approach
would prevent variations from market
to market and s ystem to s ystem, thus
allowing systems with similar capacities to carry the same number of nonlocal channels .
Future policymaking on the must
carry issue thus must take into account two factors : (1) the asymmetrical
relationship between broadcasters'
losses and cable operators' gains
as a result of non-carriage; and (2)
the variation in values of each
additional channel to cable operators .
The FCC's traditional blunderbuss
type of approach will serve neither
the public interest nor Judge Wright's
requirements.
•
The author is Professor of Law. New York Law
School. He wishes to thank Ms. Ann Bingley and
Ms. Beth Goldstein for helping to compile the
data tables in the Appendix.
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APPENDIX
TABLE I
Impact of Non-carriage on Broadcasters' Revenues

Number of Cable C hannels
Number of Cable Subscribers
Total Households in Franchise
Area
Market Share of Least Attractive
Station°
Number of Cable Households
Viewing Station
Va lue of Share ($)b
Increased Daily Va lue of Sharee

TOTAL ANNUAL
INCREASED VALUE

Mason City,
Iowa

Campbell,
Missouri

Poughkeepsie,
N. Y.

12
962

20
758

12
12,312

4,751

2, 156

58.400

1%

1%

1%

9.6
$11. 52
$4.60

7.6
$9.12
$4.10

123. 1
$147.72
$66.47

$1.679.00

$1.496.50

$24.215.55

Stockton ,
Calif.

San Rafael,
Calif.

Stamford ,
Conn.

24
38,500
134,000

30
51.000
71,606

54
39,300
113,680

Number of Cable Channels
Number of Cable Subscribers
Tota l Households in Franchise Area
Market Share of Least Attractive
Station°
Number of Cable Households
Viewing Station
Value of Share ($)b
Increased Daily Va lue of Sha ree

1%

1%

1%

385
$462.00
$207.90

510
$612.00
$275.40

393
$47 1. 60
$2 12.22

TOTAL ANNUAL
INCREASED VALUE

$75.883.50

$100.521.00

$77.460.30

a. Derived from Television/Radio Age, February, 1986, at A-3.
b. Assumes that the average independent station airs ten commercial minutes per hour, twenty hours
per day. Source: Frazier, Gross & Kadlec, Washington, D.C .
c. See R.E. Park, Audience Diversion Due to Cable Television (1978).
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TABLE I cont.

TABLE II cont.
Upper Manhattan, San Francisco, Dallas,
N.Y.
Calif.
Texas
26
93,500

35
71,308

80
93,500

315,656

315,179

400,000

1%

1%

1%

Number of Cable Channels
Number of Cable Subscribers
Total Households in Franchise
Area
Market Share of Least Attractive
Station°
Number of Cable Households
Viewing Station
Value of Share ($)b
Increased Daily Value of Sharee

935
$1,122.00
$504.90

713
$855.60
$385.02

935
$1,122.00
$504.90

TOTAL ANNUAL VALUE

$184.288.50

$140.537.30

$184.288.50

a. Derived from Television/Radio Age, February, 1986, at A-3.
b. Assumes that the average independent station airs ten commercial minutes per hour, twenty hours
per day. Source: Frazier, Gross & Kadlec, Washington, D.C.
c. See R.E. Park, Audience Diversion Due to Cable Television (1978).

TABLE II
Effect of Additional Channels on Cable Operators' Revenues
Mason City,
Iowa

Campbell,
Missouri

Poughkeepsie,
N. Y.

Number of Cable Channels
Number of Cable Subscribers
Number of Unused Channels
Best Possible Replacement
Value of Best Replacement
(Monthly)

12
962
0
pay channel 0

20
758
0
pay channel 0

12
12,312
0
pay channel 0

$2 , 164.50

$1 ,705. 50

$27,702.00

TOTAL ANNUAL VALUE

$25,974.00

$20.466.00

$332.424.00

a . Assumes that twelve to twenty-one channel systems will average almost 100% pay penetration,
and that higher capacity systems will reach roughly 50% penetration, at an average gross revenue
of $4. 50 per subscriber.
b. Assumes that systems with vacant channels will not add signals, since they did not do so when
must carry rules were in effect.
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Stockton,
Calif.

San Rafael,
Calif.

Stamford,
Conn.

Number of Cable Channels
Number of Cable Subscribers
Number of Unused Channels
Best Possible Replacement

24
38,500
0
pay channel 0

30
51,000
3
noneb

54
39,300
0
pay channel 0

Value of Best Replacement
(Monthly)

$86, 625.00

0

$39,300.00

TOTAL ANNUAL VALUE

$1.039,500.00

0

$471.600.00

Upper Manhattan,
N.Y.

San Francisco,
Calif.

Dallas,
Texas

Number of Cable Channels
Number of Cable Subcribers
Number of Unused Channels
Best Possible Replacement
Value of Best Replacement
(Monthly)

26
93,500
0
pay channel 0

35
71,308
0
pay channel 0

80
93, 500
7
noneb

$210,375.00

$160,443.00

0

TOTAL ANNUAL VALUE

$2.524.500.00

$1.925.316.00

0

a. Assumes that twelve to twenty-one channel systems will average almost 100% pay penetration,
and that higher capacity systems will reach roughly 50% penetration, at an average gross revenue
of $4. 50 per subscriber.
b. Assumes that systems with vacant channels will not add signals, since they did not do so when
must carry rules were in effect.

TABLE III
Comparison of Losses and Gains

Mason City
Campbell
Poughkeepsie
Stockton
San Rafael
Stamford
Manhattan
San Francisco
Dallas

Broa dca sters'
Losses

Cable Operators'
Gains

$ 1,679.00
$ 1,496.50
$ 24,251.55
$ 75,883.50
$100, 521. 00
$ 77,460.30
$184,288.50
$140,532.30
$184,288.50

$ 25,974.00
$ 20,466.00
$ 332,424.00
$1,039,500.00
0
$ 471,606.00
$2,524,500.00
$1,925,316.00
0
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